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GLOBALIZING THE ENVIRONMENTt
DAVID A. WIRTH*
As the United States and the world prepare to move into the
twenty-first century, the interdependence implicit in the increasingly
popular term "globalization"' is ever more apparent. In a very real sense,
one can now say both that the environment is global and that
environmental policy is caught up in the process of globalization. The
process of globalization has revealed deeply rooted linkages between
environmental quality and other public policy agendas once thought to be
distinct. These interrelationships were recently exposed in a highly visible
manner when environmental objections contributed to the demise of
President Clinton's request to Congress to authorize "fast track"
negotiating authority for trade agreements, rendering him the first
President since the procedure was initiated in the mid-1970s from whom
that power has been withheld. The recent flare-up over fast track was not
an isolated juncture, but an example of a much more pervasive
phenomenon. In the more mundane, day-to-day conditions under which
environmental policy is normally crafted, implemented, and enforced, the
interpenetration of environment and other public policy agendas is, if
anything, even more evident.
t From BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY (Maryann Cusimano ed., Worth Publishers, forthcoming
1998). Reprinted with permission. Portions of this article are based on the author's
previously published writings.
" Visiting Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, Newton, Massachusetts;
Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia.
' The term globalization, while in wide use, appears to elude precise definition. While
the term encompasses the concept of doing business in a global marketplace, in practice
the word is often used to describe a much broader spectrum of social, cultural, political,
and even economic trends. Perhaps because of the definitional difficulty, many
elaborations of the term are phrased in descriptive terms. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GLOBALISATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 19 (1997) ("Globalisation can be thought of as a process in which
economic markets, technologies, and communication patterns gradually exhibit more
'global' characteristics, and less 'national' or 'local' ones."); C. FORD RUNGE,
GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE MACHINE IN THE GLOBAL GARDEN 2 (Center
for Int'l Food and Agricultural Pol'y Working Paper No. WP97-4, 1997)
("'Globalization' nearly always describes international economic competition and its
impact on 'connectedness,' specifically the increasing transboundary flow of goods,
services, bads and disservices, including not only materiel, but information,
environmental pollution, and people.").
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These connections often manifest themselves under a rubric of
"environment and.. ." some other subject matter area. Thus, the collapse
of fast track is readily identifiable as a component of a larger debate on
environment and trade. Similarly, there are ongoing dialogues over the
relationship between environment and development and environment and
security. Each of these three subject matter couplings has acquired a fairly
well-defined shape, along with a following of scholars, government
officials, and advocates who specialize in these often difficult-to-penetrate,
interdisciplinary inquiries.
One common attribute of the "environment and. . ." subject matter
pairings is the splicing of two apparently divergent public policies, both of
which are nonetheless intended to promote human welfare. On this level,
it is pointless or even counterproductive to employ the kinds of good-
versus-evil metaphors often associated with mission-oriented public policy
agendas in areas such as the environment. After all, trade, development,
and security also provide social benefits and often employ their own
palette of symbolism.
While the "environment and.. .." formulation is perhaps helpful in
identifying the essential "interconnectedness" between environment and
other public policy agendas, that approach also has limitations. For one,
this phraseology unfortunately tends to encourage a view of the
phenomenon of globalization based on an array of horizontal, bipolar
relationships. If environmental policy can be scrutinized in this mix-and-
match fashion, there would appear to be no reason why other social
welfare demands could not also be treated in this manner. So, for
example, one might imagine juxtaposing trade and development, security
and trade, or security and development-each of which, incidentally, has
been attempted with some degree of analytical rigor. For another, these
pairings facilitate an approach that attempts to reconcile conflicts or
tradeoffs between apparently competing policy goals. There is a
considerable risk that this focus on the "bilateral" overlap between
previously established categories of public policy subject matter will
obscure a better approach that synthesizes these disparate elements at a
higher level of conceptual generality.
A different, but related theme concerns the question whether
globalization is good or bad for the environment. Each of the
"environment and . . ." modes of analysis tracks this motif, inquiring into
the beneficial or harmful effects, for instance, of trade or of development
on environmental quality. In this author's view, such questions are, in a
deeply fundamental sense, unanswerable. One can criticize as an
[Vol. 22:353
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oxymoron George Will's invocation of the "exhilaratingly unknowable
future" catalyzed by the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), but there is little in the way of meaningful policy responses that
would halt or even slow trends toward greater global interdependence.
Thanks to such innovations as widespread access to the Internet and other
modem communications technologies, globalization is proceeding apace,
with or without fast track, continued development assistance provided by
the U.S. Agency for International Development, or the expansion of
NATO, to name only a few of the pertinent recent public policy junctures.
The terms and directions of such trends, however, do appear to be
amenable to a certain degree of molding or shaping. The better
interpretation of the fast track failure is not that the U.S. public has
rejected the benefits of international trade, but that the electorate is
dissatisfied with the rules governing that trade. While it is extraordinarily
difficult or impossible to predict whether globalization as such is good or
bad for the environment, the policy choices that guide the process can
arguably be crafted so as to ameliorate adverse environmental impacts or
to encourage beneficial ones. The terms being established today that
govern relationships among such entities as governments, corporations,
international organizations, and individuals in a globalized world are
likely to have impacts, environmental and otherwise, indefinitely into the
future.
I. ENVIRONMENT AND ...
In addressing the implications of increased global interdependence,
this article first selectively surveys three of the areas in which environment
has been linked with other social policy issues: (1) development; (2)
trade; and (3) security. Drawing on insights from each of these issue
areas, this article then attempts to draw some admittedly tentative
conclusions about how the fundamental structural dynamics of the
globalization phenomenon might be channeled for the benefit of the
environment.
A. Development
Although the necessary responses may be frustratingly complex,
2 George F. Will, Judicial Exhibitionism, WASH. POST, July 8, 1993, at A17.
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the interface between environmental and development policies is probably
the easiest of the "environment and . . ." areas to grasp from a conceptual
point of view. Anyone who has ever witnessed suburban sprawl firsthand
knows intuitively that misguided or inadequate development policies can
despoil the environment. Although technically speaking the environment-
and-development dialectic applies to any country, concern about the nexus
between the two areas has been greatest in the developing world. One
substantive reason revolves around the desire to conserve fragile
ecosystems such as tropical forests, wetlands, and grassland savannahs. In
countries that are often heavily dependent on the resource base, poorly
advised development strategies can have a devastating impact on the lives
and livelihoods of the human population, particularly those at the margins
of subsistence.
The role of donor-financed assistance has substantially heightened
attention to the role of environmental quality in economic development.
The United States provides development assistance to developing
countries directly, on a bilateral basis, through the U.S. Agency for
International Development. The United States is also a member of
multilateral financial institutions which, in one manner or another, are
engaged in related operations: the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association
(IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC)-collectively, the
"World Bank group;" regional development banks, including the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank
(AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); the International Monetary
Fund (IMF); and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
These bilateral and multilateral institutions can significantly affect both
development strategies and the environment. World Bank loans can
finance massive interventions in the natural environment, such as large
dams and irrigation systems, of a scale that would be difficult to imagine
domestically. Significantly, the donor-financed nature of these
interventions creates a situation in which donor country governments and
the public in donor and recipient countries alike can influence
development-related investments in recipient countries.'
For criticisms of the activities of international financial institutions from an environ-
mental perspective, see generally PATRICIA ADAMS, ODIOUS DEBTS: LOOSE LENDING,
CORRUPTION, AND THE THIRD WORLD'S ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY (1991); ROBERT E.
STEIN & BRIAN JOHNSON, BANKING ON THE BIOSPHERE? (1978); RAYMOND F. MIKESELL
356 [Vol. 22:353
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The most significant international policy-making event on the
environment-and-development issue was the U. N. Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), dubbed the "Earth Summit,"
held in the summer of 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. This meeting firmly
introduced the concept of "sustainable development" into the policy
lexicon. Although there is no consensus definition of the term, the
following has gained broad acceptance:
Sustainable development is development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains
within it two key concepts:
* the concept of 'needs', in particular the
essential needs of the world's poor, to which
overriding priority should be given; and
0 the idea of limitations imposed by the state
of technology and social organization on the
environment's ability to meet present and
future needs."
& LARRY WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL BANKS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FROM GROWTH
TO SUSTAINABILITY: AN UNFINISHED AGENDA (1992); BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE
EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPOVERISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF
DEVELOPMENT (1994); Pat Aufderheide & Bruce Rich, Environmental Reform and the
Multilateral Banks, 5 WORLD POL'Y J. 301 (1988); John Horberry, The Accountability of
Development Assistance Agencies: The Case of Environmental Policy, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q.
817 (1985); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Damming the Third World: Multilateral Development
Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures on the Lending
Process, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121 (1988), revised and reprinted as Multilateral
Development Banks, Environmental Diseconomies, and International Reform Pressures
on the Lending Process: The Example of Third-World Dam-Building Projects in 9 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 169 (1989); Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks,
Environmental Policy, and the United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681 (1985); Bruce Rich,
The Emperor's New Clothes: The World Bank and Environmental Reform, 7 WORLD
POL'Y J. 305 (1990); David A. Wirth, The World Bank and the Environment, ENV'T,
Dec. 1986, at 33.
4 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 43
(1987). Constituted by the UN General Assembly in 1983, the World Commission was
composed of twenty-one eminent personages appointed in their personal capacities, was
chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, and was charged with
"propos[ing] long-term environmental strategies for achieving sustainable development
3571998]
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The term sustainable development has now been used in such a
wide variety of contexts by so many different people with such divergent
agendas that its core meaning has been seriously attenuated, indeed, if it
ever was clear. In at least one interpretation, the concept implies tradeoffs
between development imperatives on the one hand and environmental
integrity on the other. This characterization is at least arguably consistent
with the tone of the Rio meeting and the content of its official statements.'
While the World Bank was created and began operations soon after
World War II with a development-oriented mission, a more recent policy
trend has been to target donor-financed development assistance
specifically for environmentally beneficial purposes. The best example is
probably the Global Environment Facility (GEF), established to provide
financial support for environmentally beneficial activities and, in
particular, to serve as the interim financial institution under two major
multilateral conventions adopted as part of the UNCED process, on
climate change6 and biodiversity, respectively. The facility was
established on a pilot basis in 19918 and restructured and replenished in
1994 with $2 billion.9 The GEF operates under the tripartite direction of
to the year 2000 and beyond," Process of [P]reparation of the Environmental
Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, G.A. Res. 161 sec. 8(a), U.N. GAOR, 38th
Sess., Supp. (No. 47), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/38/161 (1984). Despite the World
Commission's effort, there still appears to be no consensus definition for the term
sustainable development. Cf. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, June
13, 1992, Principle 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev. 1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992)
("In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute
an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from
it."). This passage has been described as "the closest the Rio Declaration comes to a
definition of 'sustainable development .... ' Jeffrey D. Kovar, A Short Guide to the Rio
Declaration, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 119, 127 (1993). However, this
passage imposes less demanding constraints on development that is sustainable, both in
terms of meeting the needs of current and future generations and in conserving
environmental integrity, than the World Commission's definition.
' See David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: Two
Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. L. REV. 599 (1995).
6 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992).
'See Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
' See World Bank: Documents Concerning the Establishment of the Global Environment
Facility, Mar.-Oct., 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1735, annex C (1991).
' See Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global Environment Facility,
33 I.L.M. 1283 (1994). See generally Andrew Jordan, Paying the Incremental Costs of
Global Environmental Protection.- The Evolving Role of GEF, ENV'T, July-August 1994,
[Vol. 22:353
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the World Bank, the UNDP, and the United Nations Environment Program
(UNEP). Notwithstanding its expressly stated mission of "provid[ing]
grants and concessional funding to recipients for projects and programs
that protect the global environment and promote sustainable economic
growth,"'" the GEF has nevertheless come under considerable
environmental criticism because of its governance structure and project
design. I
B. Trade
Although the linkage between policies on environment and trade
has been extensively examined, the deeper significance of the interface
between these two social welfare goals has been elusive. Trade rules, such
as those of the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adopted
in 1947, consist of primarily "negative" obligations in which states
promise to refrain from taking actions, such as imposing certain tariffs,
that could impede market access. Trade negotiations, whether multilateral,
regional, or bilateral, usually take the form of reciprocal promises to
reduce or eliminate barriers to market access that would be unlikely to be
implemented unilaterally in the absence of such a bargained-for exchange;
many recent trade agreements consequently have the character of generic
solutions to specific trade problems, such as standards for imported food
products. The efficacy of the trade regime can be accounted for to a large
extent by the simplicity of its central free-market message: less
governmental intervention almost by definition promotes liberalized trade.
To a large extent, this gives the term "globalization" somewhat greater
precision, as consisting, at least in part, of purposefully deregulated
markets-perhaps the most readily comprehended component of the
phenomenon of globalization.
By contrast, international obligations with respect to the
at 12.
'0 Introduction to the Global Environment Facility, <http://www.worldbank.org/html/
gef/intro/gefintro.htm>.
" See, e.g., IAN A. BOWLES & GLENN T. PRICKETT, REFRAMING THE GREEN WINDOW:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE GEF PILOT PHASE APPROACH TO BIODIVERSITY AND GLOBAL
WARMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE OPERATIONAL PHASE (1994); 2 THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY: SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BIOSPHERE (David
Reed ed., 1993); David Reed, The Global Environment Facility and Non-Governmental
Organizations, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 191 (1993).
3591998]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
environment, and many other social policy areas such as labor, anticipate
and require the implementation of affirmative governmental actions
intended to address particular problems. In a microcosm, this explains the
recent clash between trade and environment. One regime is designed to
facilitate the implementation of affirmative governmental measures, and
the other is intended to ensure their absence. To a proponent of free trade,
environmental regulations are potential barriers to trade; to an
environmentalist, the rules of the international trade regime may constrain
governmental policy responses, such as prescriptive regulatory
requirements, to address environmental and public health risks. As on the
domestic level, the "cognitive dissonance," if not outright conflict,
between deregulation and the implementation of affirmative public policy
goals is clearly evident.
The shape of the environment-and-trade dialogue has now settled
into a number of well-defined problems. From the environmental side,
concerns arise over the vulnerability of environmental regulations to trade-
based challenges; the potential for triggering a "downward spiral" in the
rigor of environmental regulation through multilaterally established, least-
common-denominator harmonized standards responsive more to trade
considerations than to public health or the environment; the
appropriateness from an institutional point of view of organizations such
as the WTO for consideration of environmental matters; and the
possibility that even multilateral environmental agreements might face
trade-based constraints. From the trade point of view, there are
commensurate worries over the abuse of environmental measures for
protectionist purposes; the deployment of unilateral trade-based actions to
address international environmental challenges; and the consideration of
trade measures in multilateral instruments or by multilateral bodies dealing
with environmental hazards. While the ways in which some or all of these
contentious issues are resolved may have significant impacts on public
policy, the general approach has been one of delicate delineation of the
appropriate sphere for each regime, implying a counterproductive kind of
zero-sum set of tradeoffs between the two. Because it does not address
terms of trade or affect the regime of trade-based rules, the so-called
environmental "side agreement" to NAFTA'2 is of little utility in
suggesting an appropriate model for international trade.
An alternative approach might avoid asking the question, either
2 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 8-14, 1993, U.S.-
Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993).
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explicitly or implicitly, whether international trade is consistent with
environmental protection or vice versa. Instead, one might consider the
role of both international trade and environmental protection as embedded
in the larger public policy goal of encouraging sustainable development.
While, as discussed above, the content of the term may be vague, it is clear
that the phrase is plainly intended as an overarching construct that
encompasses international trade and environmental protection, 3 as well as
other compartmentalized public policy goals such as development
assistance and national security. From this point of view, one might well
ask whether certain environmental protection measures are so
inappropriately burdensome that they unreasonably interfere with the
capacity of present generations to meet their own needs. This is one way
of interpreting the non-tariff barrier problem discussed above. Similarly,
one might identify the notion of "sustainable trade" as trade that facilitates
the efforts of present generations to satisfy their needs while preserving
the capacity of future generations to meet their own needs. Without
further elaboration, the concept of "sustainable trade" thus defined is
probably not capable of precise application as a legal test. It does,
however, accommodate the relatively elementary notion that some types of
trade can encourage sustainability, while other kinds of trade might
undermine that goal.
C. Security
As the Cold War drew to a close, an area of research emerged
linking environmental integrity and national security. Population
pressures, resource degradation, the effects of global warming and
stratospheric ozone depletion, nuclear safety concerns, competition over
natural resources, and other environmental stresses, so the argument goes,
can lead to armed conflict." At an intuitive level, it is reasonably obvious
" For example, the WTO constitutional instrument refers to "optimal use of the world's
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development ...." Agreement
Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, pmbl. para. 1, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M.
13 (1994).
14 See generally NORMAN MYERS, ULTIMATE SECURITY: THE ENVIRONMENTAL BASIS OF
POLITICAL STABILITY (1993); LESTER R. BROWN, REDEFINING NATIONAL SECURITY
(Worldwatch Paper No. 14, 1977); Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Redefining Security,
FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1989, at 162; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, On the Threshold:
Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict, INT'L SECURITY, Fall 1991, at 76,
reprinted in CONFLICT AFTER THE COLD WAR: ARGUMENTS ON CAUSES OF WAR AND
1998]
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that in some cases environmental stresses might somewhat exacerbate the
risk of armed conflict. However, demands for greater rigor in
demonstrating this cause-and-effect relationship have produced a lively, if
occasionally strident, debate.'5 But even if environmental deterioration
contributes significantly to the risk of war, a proposition about which there
is by no means a consensus, what does that mean in concrete, operational
terms? Should the United States rank its foreign policy initiatives on the
environment, or should international organizations choose among
competing candidates for multilateral diplomacy based on the potential for
armed conflict? Such a test might even produce a skewed set of priorities,
especially in such geographic regions as North America where the
likelihood of war is small. Or in the unusual situation in which
competition over resources is plausibly related to armed attacks,'6 does that
of itself suggest that the underlying environmental risks are that much
more pressing by comparison with competing public policy concerns?
PEACE 425 (Richard Betts ed., 1994); Ted Robert Gurr, On the Political Consequences
of Scarcity and Economic Decline, 29 INT'L STUDIES Q. 51 (1985); Arthur H. Westing,
An Expanded Concept of International Security, in GLOBAL RESOURCES AND
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS IN STRATEGIC POLICY AND
ACTION 183 (Arthur H. Westing ed., 1986); Richard H. Ullman, Redefining Security,
INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1983, at 129; Gareth Porter, Environmental Security as a
National Security Issue, 94 CURRENT HISTORY 218, 220-21 (1995); Norman Myers,
Environment and Security, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1989, at 23. See also Sherri
Wasserman Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security),
The Environment and National Security, Address at National Defense University (Aug. 8,
1996) ("it is clear that environmental degradation and scarcity and related conditions
(such as increased population growth, urbanization, and migration, and the spread of
infectious diseases) may contribute significantly to instability around the world."),
reprinted in http://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Speeches/speech_
22.html#tabe (visited Jan 15, 1999); Warren Christopher, American Diplomacy and the
Global Environmental Challenges of the 21st Century, Address at Stanford University
(Apr. 9, 1996) ("The second element of our strategy- the regional element- is to
confront pollution and the scarcity of resources in key areas where they dramatically
increase tensions within and among nations."), reprinted in id. See generally
http://www.nato.int/ccms/pilot.html (NATO CCMS pilot project bibliography) (visited
Jan. 13, 1999).
15 See Marc A. Levy, Is the Environment a National Security Issue?, INT'L SECURITY,
Fall 1995, at 35, 36 ("the indirect, political threat from environmental degradation ... is.
• . the weakest substantive threat to U.S. security ...."); Daniel Deudney, The Case
Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security, 19 MILLENNIUM: J.
INT'L STUD. 461 (1990).
" See generally Joyce Starr, Water Wars, FOREIGN POL'Y, Spring 1991, at 17; Peter H.
Gleick, Water and Conflict. Fresh Water Resources and International Security, INT'L
SECURITY, Summer 1993, at 79.
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Maybe so, but these are still difficult questions that have not received
satisfactory answers as a matter of principle.
Fortunately, there is little or no need as an analytical matter to
establish definitively this cause-and-effect relationship before realizing the
security benefits of international environmental diplomacy and multilateral
cooperation in solving environmental problems. Antecedents addressing
environment in a security context can be found at least fifteen years before
the end of the Cold War, most notably in the context of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), popularly known as the
"Helsinki process."' 7 Within the CSCE and its successor, the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the environment has been
a so-called "economic dimension" or "Basket II" topic, along with
economics, science, and technology. 8
While some of the recent literature has made stark assertions about
the causes of armed conflict that are difficult to verify empirically, that
"? See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act ("Helsinki Final
Act"), Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975).
" The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was established in the
early 1970s to serve as a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation between Eastern
and Western European states, including the United States, Canada, and the Soviet Union.
The 1990 summit-level meeting in Paris, the first since the Helsinki meeting in 1975,
formally recognized the end of the Cold War, identified the CSCE as a crucial institution
in the subsequent historic developments in Europe, and commenced a greater
institutionalization of the CSCE process. See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov.
21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991). In recognition of the increasing institutional and
structural development of the institution, its name was changed at the 1994 Budapest
Summit to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). See
Budapest Summit Declaration: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Dec. 6,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 764 (1995). Today the OSCE has fifty-five participating states,
including the United States, Canada, all the countries of Europe, and all the former Soviet
republics from Europe through Central Asia. See generally ALEXIS HERACLIDES,
HELSINKI-II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE MAKING OF THE CSCE INTO AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION (1993); VOJTECH MASTNY, THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND THE
REINTEGRATION OF EUROPE 1986-1991: ANALYSIS AND DOCUMENTATION (1992); THE
CSCE AND THE TURBULENT NEW EUROPE (Louis B. Sohn ed., 1993); THE CONFERENCE
ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE: ANALYSIS AND BASIC DOCUMENTS
1972-1993 (Arie Bloed ed., 2d ed. 1993); FROM HELSINKI TO VIENNA: BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS (Arie Bloed ed., 1990); FROM HELSINKI TO
MADRID: CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 1973-1983 (Adam
Daniel Rotfeld ed., 1983); Jeffrey S. Palmer, The New European Order: Restructuring
the Security Regime Under the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 5
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (1991); Gregory F. Treverton, Elements of a New
European Security Order, 45 J. INT'L AFF. 91 (1991).
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debate has indeed been helpful in broadening the concept of security to
encompass not just military defense capabilities, but social, economic, and
political stability more generally. In this view, environmental integrity is
one of a number of attributes that contribute to stability and hence long-
term national security. Environmental degradation, by contrast, is a
destabilizing factor that tends to undermine national, regional, and even
global security. In effect, the concept of military security is replaced by
stability, of which environmental integrity is one, but not the only,
indicator. "9
This view is very much consistent with the mission of the OSCE,
which fosters a comprehensive approach to security, including arms
control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-building
measures, human rights, election monitoring, and economic security. The
OSCE emphasizes conflict prevention and avoidance, peaceful settlement
of disputes, and the creation of a cooperative system of security.
Consequently, the OSCE's work in the "human dimension" has sounded
such themes as respect for human rights, the rights of national minorities,
election monitoring, the development of civil societies, and democracy-
and institution-building, as well as the importance of the rule of law and
peaceful settlement of disputes more generally.2" This point of view,
which would treat environmental diplomacy as a mechanism for reducing
risks to stability and preventing armed conflict, is surely a preferable way
of thinking about the environment-and-security nexus.
II. GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Although perhaps tempting, an approach that seeks to demonstrate
a cause-and-effect relationship between globalization and environmental
effects, either beneficial or negative, is unlikely to serve as a helpful
analytical tool. For one, the universe of possible directions in which civil
" The natural response is that equating security and stability so attenuates the former
concept as to render it near meaningless. See Levy, supra note 15, at 43-44 ("It is
possible to imagine such constructions of security, but they would take the discussion so
far from the mainstream as to forswear any hope of linking environmental issues to the
conventional security agenda.").
20 See THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS: THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP
MEETING AND ITS AFTERMATH (A. Bloed & P. van Dijk eds., 1991); WILLIAM KOREY,
THE PROMISES WE KEEP: HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HELSINKI PROCESS, AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1993); Thomas Buergenthal, The CSCE Rights System, 25 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 333 (1991).
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society might develop, markets and economies might be opened to trade
and foreign investment, and new technologies might be disseminated in
the post-Cold War era is extraordinarily broad. It is consequently
impossible to speak of "globalization" as a unitary phenomenon with a
precisely defined outcome. Simplistic syllogisms such as the following
have been proposed to deal with the phenomenon of globalization:
Deregulated markets promote trade, trade generates wealth, and wealthier
countries have more resources to deploy for realizing environmental
protection and other public welfare goals. Mainstream economists are
increasingly realizing the limitations of such oversimplified models that,
except as applied to certain simple cases such as environmentally harmful
subsidies, are essentially articles of faith.21
Further, causal relationships between broad-gauge social policies
and trends on the one hand and environmental effects on the other are
exceedingly difficult or impossible to establish with any degree of rigor.
As noted above, much of the environment-and-security dialectic revolves
around precisely this question. Similarly, the suitability of an
environmental impact statement (EIS) required by a major environmental
statute2 was contested during the policy discussion over NAFTA. Serious
questions were raised as to whether the EIS methodology, customarily
employed to assess the likely environmental effects of specific
infrastructure projects such as a dam or a highway, could be applied to
trade rules that operate at a high level of policy generality.23 The executive
branch declined to prepare an EIS for the implementing legislation for
NAFTA, instead substituting an environmental study of generic bilateral
problems.2" Likewise, the amenability of World Bank lending in the form
21 See C. FORD RUNGE, WITH FRANQOIS ORTALO-MAGNt AND PHILIP VANDE KAMP,
FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS 95 (1994) ("trade rules alone are inadequate to the task [of
raising environmental standards in developing countries]: environmental rules are also
required"). Kenneth Arrow et al., Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the
Environment, 268 SCI. 520 (1995).
22 See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1994).
21 See Will, supra note 2 ("What kind of mind believes it is possible to anticipate and
quantify the 'impact' on the entire 'human environment' of an agreement establishing the
world's largest free trade zone, encompassing 360 million people and substantially
enlarging trade with America's third largest trading partner, Mexico?").
24 See THE NAFTA: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1993). The Clinton
administration released the final version of this document to the public a scant four days
before the House of Representatives voted on the NAFTA implementing legislation. In
litigation asserting the need for an EIS, the executive branch did not argue that this
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of sector loans-which may support governmental activities in an entire
sector like energy and which do not necessarily finance specific
infrastructure projects-and policy-based adjustment lending-which
targets macroeconomic variables like exchange rates, government deficits,
and subsidies with the goal of fundamental economic reform-to analysis
from an environmental perspective has been the subject of considerable
disagreement.25
At the same time it is indisputable that the governments, private-
sector business and industrial interests, and civil society generally are in a
state of profound transition. Despite perhaps limited capacity to predict
the environmental effects of global trends, it is difficult to deny that there
may or will be environmental repercussions, for better or worse.
To be sure, there are some stories of at least partial success in
overcoming collective action problems at the international level. In
December, 1997 at Kyoto, Japan over 150 countries concluded an
agreement on global warming. 6 The new pact calls for all participating
countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to the
warming of the earth. The prediction of global warming and its potential
negative consequences is now widely accepted by the scientific
community. However, there is no such consensus on how to reach the
goal of greenhouse gas reduction among the countries of the world. The
impediments to joint action are great, and this unanimity of purpose breaks
down when it comes to deciding what percentage of greenhouse gases
should be cut, which countries should do it, how they should do it and
when these cuts should be made.
Developing states, like China or India, believe that those
developed, wealthy countries that produce and have historically produced
most of the greenhouse gases, such as the U.S., should take the first steps
document or its precursors met the statutory requirements. See Public Citizen v. Office
of the United States Trade Representative, 822 F. Supp. 21, 27-29 (D.D.C. 1993), rev'd,
5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1041 (1994) (enumerating potential
adverse environmental effects in concluding that plaintiffs have standing to sue). Public
Citizen v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (holding no EIS required to accompany negotiation of NAFTA).
25 Such activities have nonetheless been successfully analyzed in case studies. See, e.g.,
WILFRIDO CRUZ & ROBERT REPETTO, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF STABILIZATION
AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS: THE PHILIPPINES CASE (1992);
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (David Reed ed., 1992) (case studies
of C6te d'Ivoire, Mexico, and Thailand).
2' See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
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in controlling them. Some developing countries prefer to assume
substantive obligations to reduce emissions only after they have reached
the levels of economic development and living standards that the
developed countries now enjoy. The U.S. and other developed states
believe that it is unwise to grant the developing countries an emissions
control "holiday" until some future date, because they will be major
producers of greenhouse gases very soon. Just as concerns of equity
expose deep-seated cleavages so, too, the all-pervasive nature of the
problem-associated as it is with the very essence industrial society-
strains the capacity of the international community to respond. The new
agreement, moreover, is unlikely to make more than a preliminary dent in
the looming problem of greenhouse warming.
Under such circumstances, what meaningful observations can
nonetheless be made? First, environmental policy requires a new
awareness that environmental problems are embedded in a much larger
global setting and cannot be treated in isolation. Even such metalevel
connections as between environment on the one hand and development,
trade, or security on the other have largely outlived their usefulness. Once
liberating because of their inherent need for interdisciplinary analysis and
communication between professional communities characterized by
divergent policy cultures, even these relatively new categories have now
become confining. In place of a bipolar, linear spectrum, environmental
policy now requires treatment at a higher level of conceptual generality by
reference to such overarching principles as sustainability.
With the end of the Cold War, the essential "interconnectedness"
of such issues as environment, development, trade, and security is more
readily apparent. This vision of a global order is not necessarily new.
Rather, the bilateral arms race artificially obscured more fundamental
dynamics in the international order. The Marshall Plan has long been
understood as an express recognition of the tight causal relationship
between security interests in the United States and political stability and
social well-being in Western Europe. Less obviously, even at the end of
World War II, open markets and liberalized trade facilitated political
stability and regional and global security.27 A more recent example is the
27 See, e.g., G. John Ikenberry, The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos, FOREIGN AFF., May-
June 1996, at 79, 80, 84:
Security and stability in the West were seen as intrinsically tied to an
array of institutions-the United Nations and its agencies and the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) only some among
many-that bound the democracies together, constrained conflict, and
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linkage between human rights and security in context of the Helsinki
process.
As suggested by each of these examples, the efficacy of addressing
problems of environmental quality in a globalized world will very likely
turn on the vigor of multilateral institutions. Unfortunately, at a time of
consolidation of such institutions as the WTO on other social policy
fronts, the trend in environmental management at the international level
appears to be one of compartmentalization and fragmentation. The
mission of only one international organization, the UN Environment
Program (UNEP), is exclusively environmental. In the past few years,
UNEP has been subject to serious criticism from a number of governments
and other constituencies for a lack of focus and efficacy in its work.28
Even under the best of circumstances, UNEP's mandate is limited.
Numerous other international organizations established for a variety of
other purposes consequently have also played significant roles on
international environmental challenges: the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), under whose auspices a number of marine pollution
agreements have been negotiated; the Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE), which has been the vehicle for negotiating a number of important
agreements on traditional air pollution questions; the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which in the past has
been a principal forum for discussing transboundary pollution and is now
working on the environment-and-trade nexus; and the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), which has played a major role in work
on pesticides at the international level. The negotiation of the UN Climate
Change convention adopted in 1992 was entrusted to another, new body,
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC). Several influential
observers have made serious proposals advocating the creation of a new
international organization with greater powers in the environmental field, 9
facilitated political community.
The postwar liberal democratic order was designed to solve
the internal problems of Western industrial capitalism. It was not
intended to fight Soviet communism, nor was it simply a plan to get
American business back on its feet after the war by opening up the
world to trade and investment. It was a strategy to build Western
solidarity through economic openness and joint political governance.
28 See Leyla Boulton, UN Environment Chief Under Pressure Not to Seek New Term, FIN.
TIMES, July 29, 1996, at 16.
2' See RUNGE, supra note 21, at 100-108 (advocating new World Environmental
Organization); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND
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but so far those suggestions have not translated into policy action and the
institutional impediments are significant.
What a multilateral institution does is as important as what it is.
Although perhaps not particularly exciting as a concept, "multilateral
coherence" among international institutions is essential to realizing
environmental quality goals in a globalized world. In recent years, the
World Bank and other multilateral and bilateral aid donors have
increasingly emphasized environment as a component of development
assistance, sometimes termed green conditionality. To that extent, the
environment-and-development nexus has been at least partially
internalized by such multilateral institutions as the World Bank. The
actual policy impact, however, may be minimal. Although the Banks'
(IBRD and IDA combined) annual lending to governments of
approximately $20 billion may appear to generate considerable policy
leverage, rules governing trade flows among private parties are likely to be
far more powerful agents of change in encouraging improvements in
environmental quality than direct lending will ever be.
But while development assistance is increasingly tied to
environmental performance, market access is not. Indeed, the WTO
regime of trade rules may very well send conflicting messages. For
example, a recipient country government may violate a loan covenant, a
commitment analogous in legal effect to the breach of a treaty, 0 by
allowing the manufacture of a product under conditions that degrade the
environment. At the same time, the WTO regime of rules may compel an
importing country, such as the United States, to provide market access for
that product. Refusing market access, notwithstanding the violation of the
World Bank loan covenant, could itself amount to a violation of U.S.
international obligations under the WTO regime. Such a situation, quite
appropriately described as "incoherent," creates a conflicting array of
incentives in an area where a much higher degree of congruence in
international policies is plainly necessary.
Concrete examples demonstrate a major lack of coordination
among multilateral policies with respect to environment. A festering trade
dispute between the United States and the European Union (EU) over
hormone-treated beef, a dispute representative of the larger policy
THE FUTURE (1994) (advocating new Global Environmental Organization).
'0 See Lester Nurick, Certain Aspects of the Law and Practice of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL
DECISIONS 100, 127-28 (1971) (statement by World Bank General Counsel).
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exchange over the relationship between environment and trade policy, is
the subject of two recent reports of WTO dispute settlement panels and the
WTO's Appellate Body." The EU prohibits the use of six growth
hormones in the breeding of cattle, proscribes the sale of beef treated with
those hormones, and bans the importation of such meat. The United
States, where those hormones are permitted, has strongly objected to the
ban as a nontariff barrier to trade unsupported by scientific evidence. A
WTO agreement adopted in 1994,32 which was motivated in large measure
by this dispute and which is designed to prevent the abuse of food-safety
measures as nontariff barriers to trade, establishes new science-based
disciplines for food-safety measures. The panels and the Appellate Body
in the two beef hormone disputes found that the EU measures were
inconsistent with this agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the panels
and the Appellate Body expressly rejected the application of the
"precautionary principle," codified at UNCED in a document adopted by
more than one hundred heads of state or government, which asserts the
need for policy action in cases of scientific uncertainty."
A similar development falls neatly within the environment-and-
security paradigm. The Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries at
their annual summit in Munich in 1992 established a Nuclear Safety
Account (NSA), to be administered by the EBRD.3 ' The NSA, a
multilateral mechanism to which ECU 257.2 million has since been
pledged, was intended to support operational safety and technical
improvements to Soviet-designed nuclear power plants and the
improvement of regulatory regimes in countries in which such reactors are
located, as well as ensuring long-term safety by supplying funds to support
the replacement or upgrading of existing plants. In November 1996, the
"' See EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones): Complaint by the
United States, W.T.O. Doc. No. WT/DS26/RIUSA (Aug. 18, 1997), available at
<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/distab.htm>; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones): Complaint by Canada, W.T.O. Doc. No. WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug.
18, 1997), available at id; EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, W.T.O.
Doc. No. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R, World Trade Organization Appellate
Body, January 16, 1998, available at id.
32 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Dec. 15,
1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 11 A1A-4.
31 See Munich Economic Summit Declaration, July 7, 1992, paras. 42-49 (statement of
Group of Seven major industrialized nations in Munich), reprinted in 28 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1222 (1992).
"4 See id. See generally Wirth, supra note 5, at 634-37 (discussing treatment of
precautionary approaches at UNCED).
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Ukraine signed an agreement with the G-7 and the EU supporting a
comprehensive program totaling more than $2.3 billion in U.S. dollars for
the closure by the year 2000 of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant,
including support for power sector restructuring, an energy investment
program, and nuclear safety and decommissioning. 5 As of this writing,
however, the requisite amounts have yet to be pledged to the NSA. 6 The
modem-day analogy with the Marshall Plan is all too clear, and the failure
of political will by comparison with the earlier effort by the United States
to rebuild Western Europe after World War II is stark indeed.
More generally, there is a broad conceptual connection between the
environment-as-security debate and the environment-and-development
dialectic. While poorly-designed or ill-advised development projects
financed by overseas sources, whether bilateral, multilateral, or private,
can have destabilizing effects, under appropriate circumstances foreign
assistance can also ameliorate the risk of conflict. Traditional security
institutions, whether national, bilateral, or multilateral, are unlikely to be
either well-positioned or effective for addressing the social welfare issues
of poverty, population pressure, resource degradation, and inequitable
income distribution that destabilize many national and regional settings,
especially in the Third World. Moreover, foreign aid by its very nature is
consensual,37 an essential attribute not ordinarily found in traditional
security debates involving external interventions, where the exogenous
exercise of suasion or armed force are more frequent tools.
Notwithstanding the element of consent required for foreign governments,
external inputs in the form of development assistance have often been
ineffective or counterproductive for lack of popular support. For this
'5 See Memorandum of Understanding Between the Governments of the G-7 Countries
and the Commission of the European Communities and the Government of Ukraine on
the Closure of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, November 1996 available at
<http://www-bcf.usc.edu/-meshkati/G7.html>.
6 See EBRD/Chernobyl: Plea for More Money, Europe Information Service, June 27,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws file (quoting acting President of EBRD
as stating that unless more funds can be identified to finance repairs to Chernobyl
sarcophagus, the consequences will be "too horrible to imagine"); Leyla Boulton and
Simon Holberton, West's Policies on Eastern Nuclear Plants 'Misguided,' FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1997, at 2 (quoting consultant as saying that "governments have not been
prepared to invest the sums required to achieve their goals").
31 See David A. Wirth, The United States and the World Bank: Constructive Reformer or
Fly in the Functional Ointment?, 15 MICH J. INT'L L. 687, 700 (1994) (review of
BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD
BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (1992)).
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reason, a consensus is emerging, catalyzed by specific examples of
environmental debacles financed by the World Bank and other
international financial and development assistance institutions, concerning
the need for democratization of the development process to assure both
efficacy and accountability.38 This new learning, a lesson from more than
a decade of experience, would apply equally well to assuring the
effectiveness from a security point of view of foreign assistance deployed
for that purpose.
Just as power has ebbed from national governments to international
institutions such as the World Bank and the WTO by virtue of the need for
supranational cooperation on issues such as environment, development,
trade, and security, there has been a commensurate pressure for
decentralization and democratization in the internal affairs of states. That
these trends are related to environmental policy was apparent during the
peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe, in which environmental demands
from the populace played a key role. In 1989, the CSCE sponsored a
Meeting on the Protection of the Environment in Sofia, Bulgaria, the first
convocation under the auspices of the Helsinki process exclusively
devoted to environment. The Sofia meeting, which became a lightning rod
for radical political upheavals in the host country, itself conspicuously
reinforced the close nexus between environmental activism on the one
hand and demands for democracy and political change on the other. In the
words of a member of the only nongovernmental delegation present, the
environmental activism surrounding the CSCE Sofia meeting, during
which the Bulgarian government harassed and beat environmental
demonstrators, was "plainly political" in its motivation." The Romanian
government blocked the adoption of the final document from this
conference' ° expressly because of its language on the need for popular
participation in establishing environmental policies." Some have asserted
that the 1986 Chernobyl accident played a key role in the breakup of the
former Soviet Union. Similar concepts of ensuring that power resides at
18 See id. See also David A. Wirth, Partnership Advocacy in World Bank Environmental
Reform, in THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 51 (Jonathan Fox & L. David Brown
eds., 1998). See generally note 3 supra.
'9 Author's personal communication with Liz Hopkins, IUCN/The World Conservation
Union (Dec. 9, 1997). See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE
(F.W. Carter & David Tumock eds., 1996).
40 See Sofia Meeting on the Protection of the Environment: Recommendations, reprinted
in 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 107 (1990).
" See id. at 85 (describing subsequent Romanian support for document).
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the local level are familiar in the principle of"subsidiarity" in the EU. 2
Principles of subsidiarity, local control, and democratic
accountability provide a counterweight to the globalizing trends of
deregulated markets and expanding communications technologies. As
with other currents in the globalizing world, the environmental impacts of
this phenomenon are difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, as a general
matter, broad-gauge popular demands for environmental quality can exert
a powerful influence on the direction of public policy.43 A general level of
concern among the electorate is a desirable, and perhaps necessary,
precondition for crafting effective governmental strategies with respect to
the environment. But even though the revolutions in Eastern Europe
provide empirical evidence that environmental activism can trigger
political change, the proposition that democratic principles of
accountability foster environmental quality is harder to establish.
It is now well-known that, while the Soviet government authored
some of the strictest environmental standards in the world on paper, as a
practical matter it also ravaged the environment in that country." Part of
the explanation of this phenomenon may lie in the lack of responsiveness
of a centrally planned economy, 5 but the USSR was also a totalitarian
political system. It is apparent that an unaccountable political system felt
little or no need to inform the public as to the state of the environment, to
consult with its citizenry, or to act in a manner consistent with the public's
expectations. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia was faced
42 See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. G, para. 5, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992).
The treaty adds new article 3b to Treaty of Rome, providing that:
[i]n areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved by the Community.
41 See LYNTON K. CALDWELL ET AL., CITIZENS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASE STUDIES
IN POPULAR ACTION (1976); UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987); ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 22-23 (1992); John H. Adams,
Responsible Militancy-The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law Firm, 29 REC. ASS'N B.
CITY N.Y. 631, 631-32 (1974).
44 See MURRAY FESHBACH & ALBERT FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1992);
MURRAY FESHBACH, ECOLOGICAL DISASTER: CLEANING UP THE HIDDEN LEGACY OF
THE SOVIET REGIME (1995).
45 See, e.g., Ikenberry, supra note 27.
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with discontinuities in social, political, and economic policies. Institutions
such as the EBRD have stepped in to facilitate the opening of Russia, the
Eastern European countries, and the former Soviet republics to foreign
investment and international trade.
It is considerably less apparent that a commensurate expenditure of
effort and resources is being devoted to institution-building to ensure a
sense of equilibrium among potentially competing public policy goals,
such as environment, foreign investment, development, and trade. While
this disparity is painfully obvious in the country whose territorial extent is
the greatest on the face of the planet, the same observation quite likely
applies everywhere. The price of a "democracy gap" or a "democracy lag"
may well turn out to be paid at least in part in terms of environmental
quality, not just overseas, but here at home as well.
